We examine strategic information transmission in a controlled laboratory experiment of a cheap talk game with one sender and multiple receivers. We study the change in equilibrium behavior from the addition of another audience as well as from varying the degree of conflict between the sender's and receivers' preferences. We find that, as in cheap talk games with just one receiver, information transmission is higher in games with a separating equilibrium, than in games with only a babbling equilibrium. More interestingly, we find clear evidence that the addition of another audience alters the communication between the sender and the receiver in a way consistent with the theoretical predictions. There is evidence of the presence of agents that are systematically truthful as senders and trusting as receivers: deviations from the theoretical predictions, however, tend to disappear with experience, and learning is faster precisely in the games where deviations are more pronounced.
Introduction
In many economic environments with communication of private information, the message sent by an informed sender may simultaneously influence the actions of many uninformed receivers with potentially conflicting interests. The financial statements of a firm, for example, are read by investors, unions, and other stakeholders; a politician's speech may be heard by constituencies with different agendas. In these cases, it is important whether the message is public (and so heard by all agents), or private (and so heard only by selected agents). As first shown by Farrell and Gibbons (1989) in a cheap talk game with one informed sender and two uninformed receivers, public communication may discipline the informed agent by inducing information transmission even when no information is sent in private; or it may make information revelation impossible even when information transmission to one of the receivers is possible in private.
Although there is a significant amount of literature that tests predictions of strategic models of communication with one sender and one receiver, there is no empirical study of communication between one sender and multiple receivers. In this paper we provide a first empirical investigation of this question by testing the predictions of Farrell and Gibbons (1989) in a controlled laboratory experiment. Following Farrell and Gibbons (1989) , we start by studying communication in a simple cheap talk game: two states of the world; one informed sender who can send one of two messages after observing the state; and a receiver interested in the state who can take one of two actions after receiving the message. We then move to a similar setting with two receivers.
Even when the payoffs of the receivers are independent from each other's actions (as in Farrell and Gibbons (1989) ), the addition of a second receiver interferes with information transmission to the first receiver because it affects the sender's strategy. Will the sender choose a different strategy when addressing two receivers at once? Will the receivers recognize the change in the environment and update the way they interpret the sender's message? These questions cannot be answered without data on the sender's private signal, his or her message to the receivers, and the receivers' actions, and therefore are hard to address with field data. The laboratory setting helps to overcome these difficulties by allowing direct control of all the key strategic variables.
In the case of a 2-person (one-sender/one-receiver) cheap talk game, the results of our experiment are mostly in line with the previous literature. As in previous laboratory studies, we detect a tendency for the senders to reveal too much information, and for the receivers to trust the senders too much when compared to the theoretical predictions. However, the qualitative predictions of the theory are supported by the experiment: information transmission is much higher when the conflict of interest between the sender and the receiver is small. In addition, an analysis of individual behavior confirms that the individual players' strategies are in line with theoretical predictions: most of the senders tend to use uninformative strategies in games where there exists conflict of interest between them and their opponent, and truthfully reveal strategies otherwise; most of the receivers tend to ignore senders in games with conflict and believe their messages otherwise.
In the case of the 3-person (one sender/ two receivers), the design of the experiment is such that each game can be seen as the sum of two standard one-receiver component games that have the same sender and in which the sender's message is public. This design allows us to directly compare two-receivers games with their one-receiver components, and study the marginal effect of adding a second receiver. There are five possible cases, first described by Farrell and Gibbons (1989) .
In one-sided discipline, we have truthful revelation in public despite the fact that information transmission is possible with only one (but not the other) receiver in private. In mutual discipline, we have truthful revelation in public despite the fact that information transmission is not possible with any of the two receivers in private: in this case the conflicts of the sender with two receivers offset each other. In subversion, the addition of a second receiver in conflict with the sender induces no information transmission in public, despite the fact that truthful revelation is possible theory -by increasing truthful revelation in one-sided discipline and in mutual discipline cases; by reducing communication in the subversion case; and by not changing behavior in full communication and no communication cases. 1 Similarly, in all ten comparisons, receivers modified their trust in the sender's message according to the theory. 2 We, however, find a number of deviation from the standard Nash equilibrium prediction. There is indeed evidence that the more complex strategic interaction of a three players' game has an impact on subjects' behavior and therefore on the quality of the theoretical predictions. The sender does not seem to be affected by the higher complexity of the interaction. The amount of truthful revelation of the state is statistically higher in all games in which truthful revelation is predicted by the model, and his/her behavior does not seem to be significantly affected by the component games. The behavior of the receivers, on the contrary, seems to be affected by the component games. It appears that receivers pay more attention to their "direct relationship" with the sender, and partially ignore the other receiver. We also find that a sizable fraction of agents are consistently honest as senders and trusting as receivers. This behavior may be consistent with the hypothesis that a significant fraction of agents behave "naively" as L 0 agents in a level-k behavioral model. However, there is also evidence that a level-k model alone can not fully rationalize the data.
A study of learning in the game confirms that the deviations in behavior that we observe for the receivers are associated with the complexity of the game, and shows that they tend to disappear over time. We observe no statistically significant learning in the one-sender/one-receiver game.
However, in the two-receivers game, there is statistically significant learning over time. Moreover, learning is more evident for the receivers than for the sender. Perhaps more importantly, learning is faster precisely in the games where deviations are more pronounced.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the following subsection we discuss the related literature. Section 2 describes the theoretical background. Section 3 describes the experimental design and the procedures. In Section 4 we discuss the results for the 2-person games, and in Section 5 the results for the 3-person games. In Section 6 we discuss learning effects. Section 7 concludes.
1 The effects are statistically significant in all cases. 2 All except one of the comparisons with the correct sign are statistically significant.
Related Literature
The experimental literature on cheap talk can be classified in two groups 3 . In the first group there are works that explore how cheap talk can be used to communicate intentions of play in environments with complete information. 4 In the second group the focus is on information transmission 5 , and our paper belongs to this literature. Information transmission in classic cheap talk environments a' la Crawford and Sobel (1982) has been studied in Dickhaut et al. (1995) , Blume et al. (1998) , Blume et al. (2002) , Cai and Wang (2006) , Wang et al. (2010) . As in Crawford and Sobel (1982) , these papers study situations in which there is one informed sender and one uninformed receiver, and there is no role for communication of intentions: the sender does not choose any action that affects the receiver's utility directly. Dickhaut et al. (1995) show that the key qualitative predictions of Crawford and Sobel (1982) are supported in the laboratory: notably, information transmission is higher when the degree of conflict is smaller. In a model with repeated anonymous interactions, Blume et al. (1998) show that informative communication emerges endogenously even when there is no common language (i.e. only symbols without an intrinsic meaning can be used by the sender). Cai and Wang (2006) and Wang et al. (2010) also confirm Crawford and Sobel's main qualitative results, but they highlight a systematic tendency for senders to reveal more information than predicted in equilibrium.
Our paper departs from this literature by comparing the baseline case with one receiver to the case with multiple receivers. To our knowledge it is the first (and so far the only) paper to study the effect of public communication with multiple receivers in a laboratory experiment. The literature on multiple audiences has been exclusively theoretical. Farrell and Gibbons (1989) in their seminal paper consider the same environment that we study in our experiment. In a recent theoretical contribution, Goltsman and Pavlov (2010) have generalized the key insights of Farrell and Gibbons (1989) in an environment with a continuum of states and actions. Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991) and Guarnaschelli et al. (2000) also study preplay communication in games with asymmetric information and more than two agents. In these works, therefore, 3 A survey of the experimental literature on cheap talk can be found in Crawford (1998) . 4 See, for example, Cooper et al. (1992) , Forsythe et al. (1991) , Guarnaschelli et al. (2000) , Valley et al. (2002) , Roth (1985) , Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991) .
5 Guarnaschelli et al. (2000) , Valley et al. (2002) , Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991) study preplay communication in games with asymmetric information, so these papers belong to both groups. each player is a sender and each message is heard by more than one receiver (the other players).
This literature, however, is substantially different from our work for two reasons. First, these papers do not study the differences between private and public communication. Second, and most importantly, in these works the receiver's payoff is directly affected by the sender's actions: so communication of intentions of play and of information are not separated.
A literature related to our work studies cheap talk with one receiver and multiple senders. 6
Recent experimental work studying this type of environment is presented by Lai et al. (2011) and Vespa and Wilson (2012) who have brought to the laboratory the model of multidimensional cheap talk with multiple senders by Battaglini (2002) .
Theoretical Background
We adopt the same model of cheap talk used in Farrell and Gibbons (1989) . In this model, there are two states of the world H, T . Nature chooses state H with the probability π and only one agent, the sender, is informed of the choice. After having observed the state, the sender selects a message (Heads or Tails) to send to the other players, the receivers, via a costless and a non-verifiable claim,
i.e. cheap talk. Each receiver then takes an action (Action A or Action B) and the payoffs are realized. The payoff of each receiver depends only on the state and the action that he or she has chosen. The payoff of the sender depends on the state and the actions of all receivers.
6 Relevant theoretical contributions are Gilligan and Krehbiel (1989) , Krishna and Morgan (2001), and Battaglini (2002) .
We consider two basic treatments. In the 2-person game, there is only one receiver. The payoffs in this case can be described as in Table 1 . For example, if the state is Heads and the receiver chooses action A, then the sender receives v 1 and the receiver receives x 1 ; if the sender chooses B, then both players receive 0. In all treatments we assume x 1 > 0, x 2 > 0. When both v 1 and v 2 are positive, then the players have the same ordinal preference over the actions in both states; in all the other cases there is a state in which the the sender and the receiver would choose different actions.
In the 3-person game there are two receivers. The payoff of the sender in this case is the sum of two components: the first depends only on the state and the action of receiver 1; the second component depends only on the state and the action of receiver 2. Table 2 represents the payoffs in this case. For example, if the state is Heads and receiver 1 chooses A1 and receiver 2 chooses A2, then receiver 1 obtains x 1 , receiver 2 obtains y 1 and the sender obtains v 1 + w 1 . In all treatments, we will assume x 1 > 0, x 2 > 0 and y 1 > 0, y 2 > 0. When both v 1 +w 1 and v 2 +w 2 are non negative, then the players have the same ordinal preference over the actions in both states; in all the other cases there is a state in which the sender and at least one receiver would choose different actions.
In these games we can have two types of pure strategy equilibria. In the first type, the sender's message is uninformative and therefore is ignored by the receivers in equilibrium. Each receiver in such equilibrium chooses the action based on the prior only: a pool = A if πx 1 ≥ (1 − π)x 2 , and a pool = B otherwise. This equilibrium always exists for any choice of parameters. We will refer to it as a pooling equilibrium. In the second type, the sender's message fully reveals the state. If we denote m(s) the message sent in state s, and µ(s; m(s)) the posterior probability of receiver i on state s in state s, we have µ(s; m(s)) = 1. We will refer to this type of equilibrium as a separating equilibrium. It is easy to see that a separating equilibrium does not always exist. In a 2-person game a fully revealing equilibrium exists if and only if v 1 ≥ 0 and v 2 ≥ 0. In a 3-person game, a fully revealing equilibrium exists if and only if v 1 + w 1 ≥ 0 and v 2 + w 2 ≥ 0.
Comparing Table 1 and Table 2 it can be verified that a 3-person game can be seen as the sum of two 2-player games (one with receiver 1 and one with receiver 2) with the same Sender and in which the Sender is forced to make a public message heard by both. This design allows us to directly compare two-receivers games with their one-receiver components, and study the marginal effect of adding a second receiver. In the following we will call the "component games" of a 3- player game the two games that are defined by the 3-player game when one of the two receivers is eliminated.
From the conditions discussed above, it follows that if a separating equilibrium exists with both receivers in the component games, then it must exist in public setting as well. The converse does not hold. The five cases that may arise have been described in the introduction and are summarized here in Table 3 . 7 Specific numerical examples will be presented in Section 3 where we discuss the treatments of the experiment. Hypothesis 1 is a natural extension of the hypotheses tested in previous laboratory experiments of cheap talk games described in Section 1.1. With respect to this literature, here we extend the analysis by considering the case in which there may be more than one receiver. In the presence of multiple receivers the conflict depends on the 3 ways strategic interaction of the players.
Second, we can test how behavior changes as we move from a private setting with one receiver to a public setting with two receivers. We say that adding a second receiver has a positive effect if the sender increases the informativeness of his strategy, and receiver 1 increases the correlation of his action with the message. The effect is negative if the sender reduces the informativeness of his strategy and receiver 1 reduces the correlation of his action with the message; and it is neutral if the sender's and the receivers' strategies remain unchanged. The setup presented above leads us to the following Hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. Adding a second receiver to a 2-person game has a positive effect in games of OneSided Discipline and Mutual Discipline, a negative effect in a game of Subversion, and a neutral effect in games of No Communication and Full Communication.
Hypothesis 2 constitutes a direct test of the ability of the model to predict the marginal effect on information transmission of a second receiver. Note that in the statement of Hypothesis 2 (and in Table 3 ) we keep receiver 1 as our reference point and consider receiver 2 as the additional player.
A statement similar (and equivalent) to Hypothesis 2 can be made taking receiver 2 the reference.
Experimental Design and Procedures
The experiment was conducted in the Princeton Laboratory for Experimental Social Science (PLESS) and programmed using z-Tree software (Fischbacher (2007) ). We ran 8 sessions with a total of 96 subjects. All participants were registered students at Princeton University and had been recruited by e-mail. No subject participated in more than one session, and each session contained exactly 12 subjects. The typical experimental session lasted about 1.5 hours. During the experiment, partic-ipants accumulated "points," which were exchanged for dollars at a pre-specified rate. 8 Including the $10 show-up fee, the total earnings for the experiment ranged from $24.40 − $33.80.
Each session consisted of two parts. In sessions 1-6 Part A was played first and Part B second;
in sessions 7-8 we inverted the order to control for order effects. In Part A, participants were divided into pairs and played the game with one sender and one receiver for 18 periods. Table 4 presents 6 games, each of which was repeated 3 times in a random sequence of 18 games. 9 Each period subjects were randomly assigned to a group and given a role of a sender or of a receiver, so that the composition of groups and the roles changed every period. At the start of each period participants were informed of their role and the game that was to be played with their opponent.
In addition, senders observed the state of the world and were asked to send a message (Heads or Tails) to their partner. Then receivers saw the message and chose their actions. At the end of each round, all participants viewed a summary screen that contained the state, the message, the action and their individual payoff for the round.
Part B of each session was a test of cheap talk game with two receivers. Subjects were divided into groups of three, and each of the 4 groups had one sender and two receivers. Just like in Part A, the participants were re-matched and assigned roles at random each period. The 5 different games that were played in this round correspond to the five types of public communication described above and are presented in Table 5 . 10 Each of these games was repeated 4 times for a total of 20 periods in Part B. Note that each of the 5 games is constructed by combining two games from Part A to allow for a direct comparison of private and public settings. Rounds in Part B were similar to rounds in Part A, i.e. only senders had information about the state of the world, which they had an opportunity to share with the receivers via a cheap talk message. The message had to be the same and was sent simultaneously to both receivers. Finally, each receiver took an action and the summary for the round was reported to all subjects. The total earning of the participants for Part A and Part B were a sum of the show-up fee and their earnings in each of the periods.
8 In all of the sessions 25 points were equal to $1.00. 9 Note that the payoffs of Table 4 are an affine transformation of the payoffs described in Table 1 . We chose this (equivalent) way of represent the game in the experiment to avoid negative payoffs.
10 Similarly as for the 2-person games, the payoffs of Table 4 are an affine transformation of the corresponding payoffs described in Table 2 to avoid negative payoffs. in Section 6 we discuss in detail the deviations from the theoretical equilibrium and the learning effects.
In order to describe senders' and receivers' strategies in the experiment, we construct two variables. The variable for the sender is called telling truth and it is equal to 1 for a particular sender if the sender's message coincides with the state, and it is equal to 0 otherwise. The variable for the receiver is called believing sender and is equal to 1 if the receiver's action is equal to the action that would be optimal if senders' message was in fact the true state, and 0 otherwise.
Telling truth is designed to capture the informativeness of the sender's message strategy: if the sender is using a truthful strategy, the variable should be one; if the sender is uninformative it should (on average) be equal to 1/2. 11 Similarly, believing sender is designed to describe the receiver's posterior beliefs: in fully revealing equilibria, we should expect it to be equal to one; in an uninformative equilibrium, it should be (on average) equal to 1/2. 12
In Table 6 we aggregate data for games of no conflict (games 1 and 2) and for games of conflict (games 3, 4, 5, and 6) and report the mean and the standard deviation for telling truth and believing sender. Theoretical values are presented in parentheses. Using the unpaired t-test we conclude that both senders' and receivers' strategies differ in games of no conflict and in games of conflict at 1% significance level (p-values = 0.0000). In particular, senders pass more information to the receivers when their incentives are aligned, and receiver trust senders more in games of no conflict. Table 7 lets us take a closer look at strategies in different games of no conflict and in games of conflict. Senders' behavior is clearly in line with the theoretical prediction in games 1,2, and 5. Some aversion to lying, however is present in games 3, 4, and 6: H 0 : telling truth = .5
is rejected with p-value 0.0000 for game 3, with p-value 0.0002 for game 4, and and with p-value 0.0002 for game 6. This phenomenon is in line with the findings of the previous literature on simple one-sender/one-receiver cheap talk reviewed in Section 1.1. Receivers do not appear to trust senders more (or less) than they should in games 1,2,3, and 4. 13 This is evident in games 1 and 2.
In games 3 and 4: H 0 : believing sender = .5 is not rejected with p-value 0.1834 for game 3 and with p-value 0.0666 for game 4. There is however evidence for credulity in games 5 and 6: in both cases, we reject H 0 : believing sender = .5 with p-value 0.0000. The credulity bias we observe in the receivers' strategies is also consistent the findings in the literature of simple one sender-one receiver games, though less apparent than reported in this literature. 14 The simple design of our experiment allows us to have a look at how individual strategies conform to the theoretical predictions. For each participant we gather information about their strategies in all rounds, then in Table 9 classify their strategies as a sender as"Truth," "Mix," or 12 Here too we can have separating equilibria in which the receiver systematically chooses the opposite of the strategy recommended by the sender. We will ignore this case, and there is no evidence in the experiment of these strategies.
13 Across the 8 sessions that were conducted, the mean of believing sender variable varies from 0.944 to 1.000 in game 1, from 0.889 to 1.000 in game 2, from 0.444 to 0.722 in game 3, from 0.500 to 0.722 in game 4, from 0.722 to 0.944 in game 5, and from 0.722 to 1.000 in game 6. The fact that the means in Table 7 are the same for games 5 and 6 is purely by chance.
14 A bias for credulity is observed in Cai and Wang (2006) . The difference with their findings is probably due to the fact that our setting is simpler than the their setting, where a finite number of states (larger than two) is assumed. Theoretical models that may explain this phenomenon are presented by Crawford (2003) , Eyster and Rabin (2005) , and Ottaviani and Squintani (2002) . we classify their strategies as a receiver as "Trust," "Mix," or "Deny" 16 in games of no conflict and in games of conflict. For example, an agent counted in the third sub-column ("Lie") of the first column ("Truth") is telling the truth with more than 80% probability in no conflict games, and with less than 20% probability in conflict games. According to the theory, in games of no conflict we should see that everybody is telling the truth and believing their partner, and in games of conflict everybody should mix. Thus, we expect all participants to be classified in the cell highlighted in bold. The evidence is obviously not as clear cut as the theoretical prediction, but we still find that most subjects choose strategies correctly according to this guideline: 69.8% of the senders, and 61.5% of the receivers. Because the majority of the deviations are in the "Truth-Truth" columns, Table 9 also provides another illustration of the fact that senders have a tendency to reveal the truth too frequently and the receivers tend to trust senders too much. On the other hand, we find little evidence that there are systematic liars and we will discuss possible explanations of this in Section 6.2.
Despite theoretical predictions that all games of conflict have a unique pooling equilibrium, experimentally we find that not all games of conflict are the same. Table 8 
presents p-values from
15 A sender is classified as a "Truth," "Mix," or "Lie" type if telling truth is equal to 1 for, respectively, 80% or more, 20% to 80%, or 20% or less of the time. These results are robust to using 30-70 and 40-60 cutoffs. A similar approach is used in Battaglini et al. (2010) and Cai and Wang (2006) . In a more complicated game, Wang et al. (2010) use MLE to estimate the level-k model types. 16 We use the same probability ranges as for the senders' strategies.
the unpaired t-tests of equilibrium strategy comparisons for each pair of games and demonstrates that receivers choose different strategies in games 3&4 and games 5&6. 17 This is confirmed by Table 7 , where we see that senders choose different strategies in games 3&4&6 and in game 5.
While there is slight aversion to lying in game 6 (and in games 3&4), there is none in game 5. The difference between games 3&4 and 5&6 could possibly be attributed to the fact that the conflict is not as apparent in games 5&6 as it is in games 3&4. In games 5&6 receivers see that the conflict is only in one of the states, thus they may tend to believe the senders a lot more than in games 3&4.
If subjects are pressed for time, or just inattentive, and only check whether or not there is conflict in the first state of the world (Heads), game 5 will look to them as a game of conflict while game 6 will look like a game of no conflict. Overall, we conclude that games 5 and 6 are cognitively more complicated compared to games 3 and 4, since in them it is not enough to just look at one of the states to determine whether or not this is a game of conflict. We will develop this issue further in Section 6 after discussing the results for 3-person games, where the lack of strategic sophistication is perhaps more evident.
Three person games
For the cheap talk games with two receivers we define the telling truth variable for the sender as in the previous section. Receivers' actions are now described by two separate variables: believing sender1 and believing sender2 for receiver 1 and receiver 2 respectively. The conflict in the overall game is defined as before, i.e. whether or not there is a separating equilibrium for the sender:
games 13 and 34 are games of conflict in which there is no informative equilibrium; while games 12, 23, and 56 are games of no conflict where there is an equilibrium where the sender fully reveals the state. Note that it is important to distinguish the roles of receiver 1 and receiver 2 because the games are not symmetric with respect to them. For example, according to the theory, in game 23 the sender is supposed to be truthful, and the receivers are supposed to believe him/her. For receiver 1 believing is optimal in game 2 (in which he is the only receiver), so believing is optimal even if receiver 2 is ignored. On the other hand, for receiver 2, believing is not an equilibrium in 17 The other values are all consistent with the theory. For example, the fact that the cell in column 2, row 1 is large (0.2525 ) implies that the null hypotheses that in games 1 and 2 telling truth is the same cannot be rejected with high confidence. On the other hand, the fact that the cell of column 4, row 2 is small (zero) signifies that the null hypothesis that telling truth is the same in games 4 and 2 is rejected with high confidence. In the next two subsections we first present how equilibrium behavior in the 3 players' game changes when a separating equilibrium exists and when it does not; then we study the marginal effect of having a second receiver using the 2 players game as a benchmark.
Conflict and information revelation
The first column of Table 10 provides information on how the sender reacts to conflict in the 3-person games by aggregating the data in games with no conflict in which the theory predicts telling truth = 1 and in games of conflict, in which the theory predicts telling truth = 1/2. It is clear that the amount of truth telling is higher in the first class of games than in the second. 18 As an example, consider the mutual discipline game 56. In this case the sender is not supposed to report truthfully in private, that is neither in game 5 nor in game 6. Indeed, as we find (Table 7) , the expected value of telling truth is 0.507 and 0.653 in games 5 and 6 respectively. When the message is public, and the sender is playing in the combined game 56 and truthful revelation is optimal: indeed telling truth in game 56 is 0.938. The breakdown of senders' mean strategies Table 11 confirms this conclusion: senders reveal more information in the no conflict games, and the difference is statistically significant in all cases. In addition, in games of conflict (games 13 and 34) the sender appears to report truthfully more than is predicted by the theory.
The results for the receivers are not as sharp as for the senders, but they provide the same conclusions. The second and third columns of Table 10 show that believing sender1 and believing sender2 are significantly higher in no conflict games than in conflict games. 19 Both receiver 1's and receiver 2's behavior appears to be consistent with equilibrium predictions in all games.
The results that emerge in the analysis of aggregate data are confirmed by the individual data.
In Table 12 we classify each participant in terms of which strategies they use in each of the roles (sender, receiver 1, and receiver 2) and each type of the game (no conflict and conflict). 20 The games with two receivers appear to be cognitively more complicated than the games with only one receiver: this can be seen by the fact that players are more uniformly dispersed across the possible strategy profiles, a sign of the fact that players are behaving less according to the theory.
Nevertheless, the equilibrium prediction is the mode of the distribution of players across strategy profiles for all players (38.5% for the sender, 45.8% for receiver 1, and 35.4% for receiver 2). In summary, we find significant support in the data for Hypothesis 1 for both 2-person and 3-person games. The results for 3-person games, however, are different from the results in 2-player games, as we find much less evidence of excessive truthfulness in senders' strategies and credulity in receivers' strategies in the former class of games than we do in the latter.
The marginal effects of a second receiver
We now turn to the main question of the paper -what is the effect of a second receiver on a cheap talk communication? We can breakdown this question in two parts. First, does the sender's strategy change according to the theoretical prediction? Second, do receivers recognize that the sender's strategy has changed and change their behavior accordingly?
The first quadrant in Table 13 addresses the first question. The values in the table show the difference between the mean strategies in 3-person games and 2-person games 21 . The rows in Table 13 correspond to the benchmark 2-person games and columns are the additional audience added to obtain a 3-person game. For example, the entry in the second row and first column is the difference between telling truth in the 12 game and in the 2 game. The model predicts no difference in behavior, and indeed the difference reported is small and not statistically significant.
On the contrary, the model predicts telling truth= 1 in game 1 and telling truth= 1/2 in game 13. The extent to which this prediction is supported by the data can be verified by inspecting the entry in row 1 and column 3: as predicted, this entry is negative and statistically significant.
Following a similar logic, we can interpret all the other ten values, that correspond to the ten possible marginal effects. When observed marginal effects are consistent with the theory and significant, we write them in bold in Table 13 . In all cases except one the results are consistent with the predictions. When behavior is different, the entries are different with the correct sign and 21 Significance is based on the standard errors from 2-sample t-tests with correction for clustering. In the first panel the data is clustered according to the identity of the proposers (receivers are irrelevant since their identity is unknown to a sender); in the second panel the data is clustered according to the identity of the receivers (again the identity of the other players are irrelevant for a receiver since their identity is unknown). Mann-Whitney U tests have been done as a robustness check to confirm the results. Results in bold are consistent with the theoretical predictions. Results not in bold show a statistically significant difference when there is no difference according to the theory. statistically significant. When behavior is predicted to be the same, the differences in the entries are not statistically significant. The only exception is the difference between games 2 and 23.
The theory predicts no difference, the data shows a small difference of 0.0825, but it is statistically significant.
A similar analysis can be done for believing sender. Of the ten possible cases, all but one are fully in line with the theoretical predictions. The case that departs from the theoretical predictions is the comparison between game 13 and game 3. According to theory, there should be no difference in strategies as both game are games of conflict. Nevertheless, we find that receiver 2 believes the sender more in game 13 than in game 3.
In summary, we find significant support in the data for Hypothesis 2. The evidence is in line with theoretical predictions in all of the ten cases for senders, and in eight over ten cases for receivers.
Deviations from equilibrium and learning
The discussion of the previous section shows that the comparative statics of the model is supported by the data. Still, there are a number of points of divergence in the data from the theory.
When compared to Table 9 , Table 12 makes it clear that subjects' behavior is more dispersed in the 3-person games, suggesting that participants find it harder to play it. This is not, perhaps, a 
Complexity of the game and strategic behavior
To address the first set of questions we study how the deviations from equilibrium behavior depend on the type of game that is played. In each game j, the variables mistake of receiver i and mistake of sender measure deviations from the theoretical equilibrium: the first is the difference between the equilibrium probability of believing the sender and the empirical frequency (in a particular round of a given session) of believing sender i in game j expressed as a percentage of the maximal possible mistake. 22 Similarly, the second is the difference between the equilibrium probability of revealing the true state and the empirical frequency of telling truth in game j expressed as 22 The absolute value of the difference between the equilibrium probability and the empirical frequency of telling truth and believing sender ranges between 0 and 1 in games of no conflict, and between 0 and 0.5 in games of conflict. To standardize these variables, we therefore represent the mistakes as percentages of the maximal possible mistake: 1 in games of no conflict and .5 in games of conflict. For 2-person games, in each session we have 18 values for mistake of sender and 18 values for mistake of receiver, so that each number uses the frequency of action across 6 groups of 2. For 3-person games, in each session there are 20 values for mistake of sender, mistake of receiver1, and mistake of receiver2, so that each empirical frequency uses the average action across 4 groups of 3. We ran a total of 8 sessions, so we have 144 observations for 2-person games and 160 observations for 3-person games. a percentage of the maximal possible mistake. Table 21 presents a regression where these measures of mistakes are regressed against a number of variables describing the characteristics of the game.
Start by considering the last column ("all games"). The two regressions described in this column use data from both 2-person and 3-person games. Conflict is a dummy variable equal to one if it refers to a game of conflict; 3-person game is a dummy equal to one if the game has 2 receivers; period is a control variable measuring the period. Players tend to make more mistakes in games of conflict than in games without conflict: for the sender and the receivers it is significantly positive at a 1% level. This suggests that games of conflict are more difficult to play than games without conflict. This is not surprising, since games of no conflict have equilibria in pure strategies, while in games of conflict equilibria are in mixed strategies. The first and second columns of Table 21 focus on 2-person games and 3-person games and confirm the effect of the variable conflict described above. 23 To further understand the relationship between mistakes and the complexity of the game, we introduce a variable that measures the complexity of game for two receivers, cog i : it is 1 for receiver i if the conflict in the individual component game is different from the overall game. For example, game 13 is cognitively complicated for receiver 1, because he or she needs to consider both his own and receiver 2's component games: game 1 is a game of no conflict while the overall game 13 is a conflict game. In column (1) of Table 22 we report the result of a regression analysis where mistake of receiver i is explained as a function of cog i and other controls. Note that cog 2 is significant in almost all specifications for the sender (except (3) and (4)) and in all specifications for receiver 2. The variable cog 1 is significant in specifications (3) and (4): after controlling for the period of the game, and the level of experience in more complicated games, the variable is significant for receiver 1 as well. 24 We can therefore conclude that there is evidence that players find the 2-receivers game more complicated to play, and that this complication is more pronounced in games that are in fact more complicated, i.e. with cog i = 1. This suggests that receivers tend to underestimate the effect of the presence of a second receiver. 23 We will comment on the effect of the other control variables (period, conflict experience, and experience as a sender ) in the next section, where we discuss learning effects.
24 As it was mentioned before, the difference between receiver 1 and 2 is not due to the identity of the players (all agents are randomly and anonymously assigned to all the possible roles in the game), but due to the fact that the receivers' games are not symmetric. Crawford (2003), Cai and Wang (2006) , and Wang et al. (2010) find level-k models to successfully explain subjects' behavior in cheap talk experiments. Following them, in this section we present a test of the level-k model in our setting.
We consider the level-k model that is anchored at L 0 behavior of senders being truth-telling. and level L 1 receivers best respond to level L 1 senders, and so on. Level L ∞ is the limit as k → ∞, if it exists. It is important to note that the limit may not exist, so the predicted strategy for types with high level of k may not coincide with the Nash equilibrium. In our model this will allow us to distinguish level-k predictions from the Nash equilibrium. We follow this procedure for every 2-person and every 3-person game and summarize the theoretical predictions of the level-k model in Tables 14 and 15 . In these two table, sender's strategy is "Truth" if telling truth = 1, "Lie" if telling truth = 0, "Tails" if the senders sends message "Tails" regardless of the state, "Heads" if the message is always "Heads", and "Mix" if the sender is playing the mixed strategy. Similar for the responders, "Trust" corresponds to believing sender = 1, "Deny" corresponds to believing sender = 0, and "Mix" is the mixed strategy. Whenever the agent is indifferent we assume that he or she uses a mixed strategy. 26
The behavioral predictions of level-k model for games of no conflict are identical to the Nash equilibrium predictions: "Truth" for the sender; and "Trust" for the receiver. As it can be seen from Tables 9 and 12 , these predictions are well supported by the data both in 2-player and in 3-player games. The games of conflict are more interesting because the Nash equilibrium does not fully explain the data; and (even more importantly) because the standard level-k model differs from the predictions of the Nash equilibrium and so the two hypothesis on agents' behavior can be identified.
Consider 2-player games first. Table 16 shows that we can classify senders in three categories: 27 those who always tell the truth; those who always lie; and those who use a mix between lying and telling the truth. A similar observation is true for receivers as well, who can also be classified in those who always believe, those who always distrust, and those who mix. In both cases, the presence of a sizable fraction of agents who behave as L 0 is in conflict with the Nash prediction and suggest that the level-k models may help explaining the evidence. Indeed, the behavior in games 5 and 6 cay be rationalized quite well by the level-k model. Level-0 players may explain why we have agents who always tell the truth or always believe. Agents with a level higher than 26 As we will see this is the assumption that is most favorable to the level-k model. 27 We use 100 − 81%, 80 − 21%, and 20 − 0% percentage intervals for classification. We have verified that the results are robust to using other classifications: for example, the cutoffs 70% − 30%, and 60% − 40% (the latter are the cutoffs adopted by Cai and Wang (2006) ). A more sophisticated approach is used by Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006) , who classify the agents' strategies by maximum likelihood. Though this approach may lead to more accurate estimates in games with more complex strategy spaces, we feel that our approach is completely adequate in the case with only two actions.
L 1 , on the other hand, find it optimal to mix. So we can explain almost all the data by assuming that agents are between level L 0 and L 2 (or higher). In these games the Nash equilibrium would not be able to explain the behavior of the L 0 players.
The most interesting case, however, is given by games 3 and 4. In these games, level-k model predicts that level L k senders find it optimal to tell the truth for k even; level L k+1 senders find it optimal to lie for k + 1 odd. Similarly, level L k receivers believe their partner and level L k+1 distrust (see Table 14 ). This implies that as k → ∞ the strategies never converge to the mixing strategy, which is the Nash Equilibrium prediction. This feature allows us to test level-k model against the Nash equilibrium in a sharp way. Table 16 clearly shows that neither level-k alone, nor Nash equilibrium alone can fully explain the data in games 3 and 4. The presence of a large set of agents who always believe or always tell the truth (depending on the role), suggests that the predictions of the Nash equilibrium can be improved by assuming a significant share of "naive" agents who behave as level L 0 players. The share of players who mix, on the other hand, is always very substantial (53.1% of receivers and 56.3% of senders). These levels of individual mixing cannot be rationalized by the standard level-k model for any level of k. 28 This evidence, therefore, suggests a significant number of Nash equilibrium players in the pool.
Behavior in the 3-person games leads to similar conclusions. In the games of conflict 13 and 34 the level-k predictions are the same as in games 3 and 4: Level L * * k senders (receivers) find it optimal to tell the truth (believe) for k * * even ; level L * k senders (receivers) find it optimal to lie (not to trust) for k * odd.
From Table 12 we observe that the most popular strategy for the subjects is to tell the truth in the games of no conflict and to mix in the game of conflict. This fact is in contrast with the level-k model, since level-k players never mix, for any k. A sizable fraction of players behave as L 0 by believing the sender when they are receivers, and telling the truth when senders both in games of conflict and no conflict: this is consistent with the presence of "naive" players. The fact that there are few senders that consistently lie and few receivers that consistently deny, however, is also evidence against the level-k model since it would imply that there are no L k agents for any even k,
28 Of course one can design a more sophisticated type of level-k model (where for example level k players believe that other players types are distributed between 0 and k according to some distribution, as in Camerer et al. (2004) ). In our model, however, this more sophisticated level-k solution would help only if we impose strong restrictions on the beliefs of the players that would make them quite indistinguishable from the beliefs of the players in a Nash equilibrium. which seems quite unlikely.
Finally, in order to explore whether the same subjects exhibit lower levels of sophistication in the role of a sender and in the role of a receiver, we classify individual behavior on the basis of their behavior both as senders and as receivers. The rationale for this is that if an agent behaves as, say, a L 0 as a sender, perhaps he or she should be expected to behave as a L 0 as a receiver as well. In Table 18 , we present the distribution of types for the games of conflict. The largest number of subjects behave according to the Nash Equilibrium prediction, the "Mix" strategy: so they mix both as senders and as receivers in games of conflict. 29 In the case of 3-person games, the deviations are much more pronounced and provide a stronger support for level-k model. We note that there is a significant fraction of individuals (9.4% in 2-person games and 12.5% in 3-person games) who tell truth as senders and trust in the receiver's role. However, there are also many individuals who are classified as truth-tellers when senders, but mix in the role of the receivers and vice versa. Therefore, we do not find that only level L 0 senders act L 0 receivers or that only L 0 receivers act as L 0 senders.
In summary, both the games with 2 players and with 3 players seems to suggests that neither the standard level-k model, nor the Nash equilibrium alone can explain the data. Instead a model that assumes a Nash equilibrium that is augmented by a sizable fraction of "naive" agents (L 0 types, who always report truthfully the state or believe the sender) seems to be able to explain the Tables 19 and 20 Table 19 and Table 20 use the unpaired t-test to compare the strategies in sessions 1-6 to strategies in session 7-8. We see that in most cases, there is no statistical significance between Table 22 , where we add a dummy variable for the order of play to explain deviation from equilibrium strategies. In the regressions, we find that mistakes made by senders and by receivers are not explained by the order of play.
Order Effects

Learning
Another explanation for subjects' deviations from the equilibrium predictions could simply be the lack of experience. In this section we explore potential learning effects to see if the behavior of the participants becomes more strategic over time.
If it is true that subjects find that 3-person games are harder to play because of their complexity, then we should observe that learning is more pronounced in the 3-person games than in the 2-person games. Furthermore, we should expect to observe more learning for the receivers in games that are cognitively more complicated for them, that is in games with cog i = 1 for receiver i. For the senders, we will control for both cog 1 and cog 2 to see if more learning occurs in cognitively complicated games. Table 21 , where the number of mistakes discussed previously are regressed against the period and other control variables, shows that there are no significant learning effects in the 2-person games. This is not surprising, since there are few mistakes in 2-person games, and subjects appear to play according to the equilibrium predictions.
Therefore we can focus on learning in 3-person games. Let's first consider the behavior of receivers. In the second specification in Table 22 , in the regression of the "mistakes" variable we control for the period, whether or not the current game is a game of conflict, for the order of play and for cog i . We find that the coefficients in front of the variable period are negative, suggesting that there are less mistakes over time, i.e. there is evidence of learning effects: the magnitudes, however, are not significant. The variables cog i also have the sign we would expect (positive, since it is natural to expect that cognitively difficult games are associated with more Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Table 22 : Learning regressions for 3-person games Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 mistakes). While the sign of cog 1 is not significant, the sign of cog 2 is significant at the 1% level and the magnitude is large. 30 In the third specification in Table 22 , we add an interaction effect cog i × period. In this case both cog 1 and cog 2 are positive, significant (at the 5% level) and large.
Perhaps more interestingly, the interaction effect cog i ×period has a negative sign for both i = 1and i = 2, suggesting that learning is more pronounced in games that are more cognitively complex.
This variable, however is significant only for receiver 1 (at the 10% level). The signs of cog i and cog i × period are in line with the prediction also in specification 4, where we add additional control variables. Moreover, in specification 4, they are all statistically significant, with the exception of cog 2 × period.
Consider now learning of the sender in 3-person games. The variable period is not significant in any specification, suggesting that it is not an important factor. In the second specification in Table 22 we simultaneously control for cog 1 and cog 2 : senders are more likely to make mistakes in games that are cognitively complicated for receiver 2. The fact that senders tend to pay more attention to the game with the first receiver is interesting and can possibly contribute to the higher amount of mistakes by the second receiver. Adding interaction effects cog 1 ×period and cog 2 ×period confirms that learning is limited for the sender: neither in specification 3 nor in specification 4 their sign is significant.
To summarize, the results presented in this section suggest that subjects in the 3-person games find that cognitively complicated games are more difficult to play. We find that the number of mistakes tends to decrease over time for the receivers, but all learning is concentrated in the cognitively complicated games (cog i = 1 for receiver i). On the contrary, there is no significant evidence of learning for the senders.
Conclusion
This article presents results from the first experimental study of cheap talk communication between one sender and multiple receivers. We find that despite the fact that subjects find games with multiple receivers cognitively more complicated than games with just one receiver, there is 30 The difference between cog1 and cog2 is not surprising given that subjects tend to make more mistakes in receiver 2's role compared to receiver 1's role. This, for example, can be seen from Table 12 by comparing the fractions of participants in receiver 1's role and in receiver 2's role who behave according to the theory. strong evidence that the effect of an additional audience on information transmission is in line with theoretical predictions. Just like the previous studies (with one sender and one receiver) we find that that there is a significant fraction of agents who are truthful as senders and trusting as receivers in conflict games, which is consistent with the behavior of L 0 type of agents in a level-k behavioral model. However, our findings also suggest that a level-k model alone is not able to explain the data. Furthermore, our analysis of learning suggests that mistakes are made mostly in cognitively complicated games and tend to disappear over time.
The first part of our experiment is a regular 2-person cheap talk game with one sender and one receiver. It provides a benchmark for analyzing the games with multiple receivers as well as allows us to connect to previous experimental literature on cheap talk games. In the second part of the experiment we test the effect that a second audience has on the information transmission between a sender and a receiver. Our results for 2-person games are consistent with previous findings and the addition of another audience in 3-person games changes subjects behavior according to the predictions in Farrell and Gibbons (1989) . Furthermore, the design of 3-person games allows us to distinguish the predictions of level-k model from the Nash equilibrium. We find that neither the level-k nor the Nash equilibrium alone is able to explain the data, while a combination of the two seems to be consistent with the evidence. An experimental test of a game with a richer state and strategy spaces would be an interesting direction for further research. Likewise, how the size of the audience (with more than two receivers) would affect the results remains an open question.
A Appendix
A.1 Instructions
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research experiment on group decision making.
During the experiment, we will require your complete and undivided attention, so please refrain from distractions such as outside books, homework, and internet. We also ask you to turn off your cell phones. It is important that you do not talk or otherwise communicate with any other participants. Raise you hand if you have any questions and one of us will come to you. Now please pull out the dividers to either side of your chair as far as they go to assure your privacy as well as the privacy of the other participants.
In this experiment you will be given an opportunity to earn money. How much you earn will depend on your decisions and the decisions of other participants. During the experiment you will be accumulating points, which will be exchanged for money at the following rate: 25 points = $ 1.00. All earnings will be paid in cash at the end of the session. You will be paid anonymously (no other participant will be informed of your earnings).
Part A
This part of the experiment will consist of 18 decision rounds. Before each round the computer will randomly divide you into pairs. Hence, in each round your group consists of yourself and 1 other participant. In addition, for each group the computer will toss a fair coin such that there is an equal chance of getting Heads or Tails. Your and your partner's payoff for the round will depend on the outcome of the coin toss AND on the action. Here is a sample payoff structure:
[SHOW sample payoff tables here initial screen shot for each round]
Each of you will be assigned a role of an S-player or an R-player. In each group exactly one player will be assigned an S-role and one player will be assigned an R-role. If you are an S-player, you will observe the outcome of the coin toss and will have an opportunity to communicate it to the R-player. As an S-player, you will send a message whether the outcome of the coin toss is Heads or Tails, however, you are not required to provide truthful information to the R-player. The R-player will not observe the actual outcome of the coin toss, only the S-player's message about it. Finally, the R-player will choose action A or action B. Your final payoff for the round will be realized and reported to you.
In order to familiarize you with the experiment will go through two practice rounds together.
Please do not click or input any information until you are instructed to do so. [ To begin, please double-click on (z-leaf icon) on your desktop.] Remember that the first two rounds are the practice rounds, thus your payoff will not be counted towards the final earnings for the experiment. They will be followed by another 18 rounds with actual payoffs.
[Start practice rounds on server]
We are ready to begin. Each of you have been assigned a role [point out] . Here is the S-player's screen. Note that the outcome of the coin toss has been revealed to the S-player.
[slide]
And this is the R-player's screen. No information about the outcome of the coin toss is shown.
If you are S-player, please select a message that is the same as your coin toss. If you are R-player, click OK. [slide]
Here are the round payoffs again for your reference. Please make sure you understand where your payoff is coming from. After you are done, please click OK to continue to the second practice round.
[Go through second practice round, now ask S-player to select opposite of his state and R-player select Action B]
Any questions?
Now we are going to complete a short quiz. Please answer all questions individually. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and one of us will come to assist you.
[start quiz]
We are now done with the quiz, and ready to begin Part A of the experiment. This part of the experiment will consist of 20 decision rounds. Now before each round the computer will randomly divide you into groups of three. Hence, in each round your group consists of yourself and 2 other participants. One participant in each group will be assigned an S-role and two participants will be assigned an R-role. Therefore, each of you will be randomly assigned a role of an S-player, R-player-1, or R-player-2. Just like before, for each group the computer will toss a fair coin such that there is an equal chance of getting Heads or Tails. If you are an R-player, your payoff will depend on the outcome of the coin toss AND your own action. If you are an S-player, your payoff will be determined as a sum of two numbers. The first number is calculated from the outcome of the coin toss AND action by R-player1. The second number is calculated from the outcome of the SAME coin toss AND action by R-player2. Here is a sample payoff structure:
If you are an S-player, you will observe the outcome of the coin toss and will have an opportunity to communicate it to the R-players. As an S-player, you will send the SAME message to both Rplayers whether the outcome of the coin toss is Heads or Tails. Again, S-player is not required to provide truthful information to the R-players. The R-players will not observe the actual outcome of the coin toss, only the S-players message about it. Finally, the R-player1 will choose action A1 or action B1, and the R-player2 will choose action A2 or action B2. Your payoff for the round will then be reported to you.
Any questions? Again, we start with two practice rounds, and they will be followed by 20 paying rounds. Please do not start until you are instructed to do so.
[start practice rounds]
[explain round 1: S-player selects the same message as the coin toss, R-player1 selects Action A1, R-player 2 selects Action A2]
[explain round 2: S-player selects opposite message. R-player1 selects Action A1, R-player 2 selects Action B2] Any questions?
[Go through practice screen shorts, announce instructions to click to proceed]
We are now ready to proceed to PART B of the experiment. Any final questions?
[start quiz]
We are now done with the quiz, and ready to begin Part B of the experiment.
[start Part B] [DO PART B -20 rounds] This is the end of the experiment. You should now see a screen, which displays your total earnings in the experiment. Please record this on the Earnings row of your payment receipt sheet.
Also enter $10.00 on the show-up fee row. Add the two numbers and enter the sum as the total.
We will pay each of you in private in the next room in the order of your Subject ID numbers.
Remember you are under no obligation to reveal your earnings to the other players.
Please put the mouse behind the computer screen and do not use either the mouse or the keyboard at all. Please be patient and remain seated until we call you to be paid. Do not converse with the other participants or use your cell phone. Thank you for your cooperation.
Could the person with subject ID number 0 please go to the next room to be paid. Please bring all your belongings with you, including your payment receipt sheet.
A.2 Sample Screenshots
Please see Figure 1 and Figure 2 for sample screen shots in 2-person and 3-person games.
